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LADDER SAFETY: 




Search Google for tips on how to climb a ladder safely, and you will 
collect many useful pointers. Before you climb, make sure the feet of the 
ladder can’t slip backward and the top of the ladder doesn’t slide or wobble 
when you put weight against it. Wear shoes with nonskid soles. Face the 
ladder as you climb. Grab onto the rungs using a hand-over-hand method. 
Don’t let go of one rung before grabbing hold of the next, and so on. Who 
knew that a seemingly straightforward activity took such planning and 
concentration? Unfortunately, there seem to be no guides for jumping or 
stepping off.1 
It turns out that safely navigating a ladder in a professional context also 
takes preparation and thought. The actual facts in a recent employment 
dispute2 provide a useful backdrop for lawyers working with corporations 
or other legal entities to consider their ethical obligations upon discovering 
that an organizational client has failed to act lawfully—for example, by 
underpaying a substantial tax liability. Ethics rules call on lawyers to report 
violations up the organizational ladder and permit lawyers, in some 
circumstances, to disclose confidential information in order to prevent, 
mitigate, or rectify financial injury caused by a client. But the rules are 
tricky and the consequences of violating them can be significant. 
The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(the Model Rules), primarily Model Rule 1.13, provide a “how-to” guide 
for principled behavior on the part of corporate attorneys—a guide to safe 
climbing, if you will. Such guidance, however, is precatory as it pertains to 
disclosure of confidential information; failure to comply has no 
consequence whatsoever in terms of lawyer discipline. In contrast, electing 
to disclose a client’s unlawful behavior in circumstances explicitly 
permitted by the Model Rules can nonetheless result in professionally 
devastating outcomes, suggesting perhaps, at a micro level, that prudent 
lawyers generally should elect not to disclose and, at a macro level, that 
                                                                                                                 
  * Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges 
thoughtful comments provided by Professor Michael B. Lang on an earlier draft of this Article. 
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 1. There are plenty of videos, however. See, e.g., “Dog Jumping Off a Ladder,” http://www 
.metacafe.com/watch/22214/pet_star_dog_jumping_off_a_ladder/ (last visited May 16, 2012); 
“Serge Drunk Jumping Off a Ladder,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DjfmN0m_2V8 (last 
visited May 16, 2012); “Guy Falls Off a Ladder,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=1iy9h6I28NM (last visited May 16, 2012). 
 2. Dean v. Feed the Children, Inc., No. CJ-09-9704 (Okla. Cty. D. Ct. filed Oct. 14, 2009). 
554 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 6 
neither the American Bar Association nor Congress have gone far enough 
in their efforts to utilize lawyers in rooting out corporate malfeasance. In 
enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley),3 Congress 
appeared to be serious in that regard. Regulations implementing Sarbanes-
Oxley, however, do not mandate disclosure outside the corporation and, 
therefore, have no more “bite” than the Model Rules. Despite some 
compelling reasons for permitting disclosure of clients’ bad behavior, 
economics dictate that it should be a rare case in which a lawyer will 
actually disclose. 
I. DEAN V. FEED THE CHILDREN4 
The plaintiffs (Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, and collectively, the Plaintiffs) 
were certified public accountants employed by Feed the Children, Inc. 
(FTC),5 a § 501(c)(3) charitable organization.6 Plaintiff 1 held the title of 
Controller and had worked for FTC since April 2008.7 Plaintiff 2 was the 
Director of Financial Reporting and had worked for FTC since March 
2009.8 
In July 2009, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of FTC approached an 
accounting supervisor (the Accounting Supervisor) about the fact that FTC 
had not been paying Oklahoma state use tax on purchases in which vendors 
had not charged the appropriate sales tax.9 Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 were 
brought into the ongoing conversation.10 Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 2, and the 
Accounting Supervisor all agreed that FTC should contact the Oklahoma 
Tax Commission to admit that the tax had not been paid.11 It was their 
collective experience that coming forward typically resulted in the 
reduction or elimination of penalties and interest.12 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002). The up-the-ladder rules are set forth in § 307 of the Act, id. § 307, and part 205 of Title 17 
of the Code of Federal Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2011). 
 4. These facts are based on Plaintiffs’ Amended Petition and are assumed to be true for 
purposes of this Article. The author of this Article neither attempted to investigate the truth of any 
of the allegations nor takes the position that any such allegations are, in fact, true. 
 5. Amended Petition, at 1–2, Dean v. Feed the Children, No. CJ-09-9704 (Okla. Cty. D. Ct. 
filed Oct. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Amended Petition]. 
 6. See Letter from Stephanie D. Dean, Stefani Hovarter & Stephanie Mendenhall to 
Oklahoma Tax Commission (Sept. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Letter to Oklahoma Tax Commission]. 
 7. Memorandum from Stephanie Dean, Stefani Hovarter & Stephanie Mendenhall to the 
Board of Directors of Feed the Children, Inc. 1 (Sept. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum to the 
Board]; Amended Petition, supra note 5, at 2. 
 8. See Amended Petition, supra note 5, at 2; See Memorandum to the Board, supra note 7, at 
1; Amended Petition, supra note 5, at 2. 
 9. Memorandum to the Board, supra note 7, at 2. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. According to Plaintiffs’ court filings, the Oklahoma Tax Commission administered a 
voluntary compliance program under which taxes and interest are assessed for a three-year period 
only, and penalties are waived. Id. at 1–2.  
2012] Disclosure of Corporate Client Confidences 555 
According to the Plaintiffs, the CFO had indicated that she was aware 
when she began her employment at FTC in 2001 that Oklahoma sales and 
use taxes were not being paid.13 Her approach had been to inform vendors 
who were not charging sales tax that FTC was not exempt from such tax so 
that vendors would charge the appropriate tax on a going-forward basis.14 
Additionally, the CFO reportedly indicated that she had chosen to neither 
approach the Oklahoma Tax Commission about the past tax liability nor 
pay the past due use tax in hopes that the statute of limitations would expire 
without the Oklahoma Tax Commission discovering the noncompliance.15 
Believing that, as of July 2009, the statute of limitations had expired, it 
would now be safe for FTC to begin filing use tax returns.16 The Plaintiffs, 
however, disagreed with the CFO’s position, contending that the statute of 
limitations does not run when fraud or tax evasion are involved.17 In their 
view, if the Oklahoma Tax Commission had discovered the liability on its 
own, it could have assessed tax for the entire period of FTC’s existence.18 
Over a seven-year period, Plaintiffs estimated exposure of more than $1.1 
million, not including penalties and interest.19 FTC filed a monthly use tax 
return for July 2009 and remitted the tax due thereunder on August 20, 
2009.20 A return for August 2009 was prepared for filing on September 21, 
2009.21 
On September 17, 2009, Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 2, and the Accounting 
Supervisor took two actions that appear to have precipitated the loss of 
Plaintiffs’ jobs and the subsequent lawsuit.22 First, they sent a letter to the 
Oklahoma Tax Commission reporting FTC’s use tax delinquency.23 Second, 
they submitted a memorandum to the Board of Directors of FTC (the 
Board) outlining their discussions and the events relating to the use tax and 
making several recommendations to the Board,24 including the following: 
1. that the Board undertake a thorough evaluation to determine FTC’s 
actual use tax liability; 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. at 2.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 3.  
 21. Id.  
 22. See Amended Petition, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 23. Letter to Oklahoma Tax Commission, supra note 6. 
 24. According to the Memorandum to the Board, the Plaintiffs and the Accounting Supervisor 
believed they were obligated to notify the Oklahoma Tax Commission for three reasons: (1) 
potential civil and criminal liabilities, (2) potential professional discipline (the Plaintiffs and the 
Accounting Supervisor are certified public accountants), and (3) the fact that public funds were 
involved. Memorandum to the Board, supra note 7, at 1. This Article makes no attempt to 
evaluate the accuracy or validity of the Plaintiffs’ beliefs in this regard. 
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2. that the Board retain the services of a tax attorney to represent the 
organization in dealing with the Oklahoma Tax Commission 
regarding the use tax; 
3. that the Board notify its external auditors of the noncompliance so 
that it could be properly reflected on the organization’s audited 
financial statements, and 
4. that the Board conduct research to determine whether similar tax 
liabilities exist in any other states in which FTC operates.25 
On September 29, 2009, both Plaintiffs were fired.26 Several weeks 
later, the Plaintiffs sued their former employer for wrongful termination.27 
II. WHAT IF THE PLAINTIFFS HAD BEEN LAWYERS? 
Other than the parties themselves, no one knows why the FTC Board 
fired the Plaintiffs. Although possible, it is hard to believe that the 
Plaintiffs’ jobs were lost merely because they brought their disagreement 
with the CFO to the Board. It is more likely that the Board was displeased 
with the employees’ decision to disclose FTC’s tax problem to the 
Oklahoma Tax Commission without first giving the Board (or anyone else 
within the organization) an opportunity to reverse the CFO’s decision. It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to comment on the legality of the Board’s 
action. Similarly, this Article does not examine the ethical propriety of 
certified public accountants disclosing substantial underpayments of tax.28 
The issues addressed herein relate only to lawyers’ ethics: if the Plaintiffs 
had been attorneys rather than accountants, would their actions have been 
consistent with the ethical rules governing lawyers? On a broader level, and 
perhaps more importantly, what does the answer to the first question reveal 
about the efficacy of lawyers’ ethics rules in influencing lawyers to protect 
non-clients whose interests are both relevant and affected (e.g., shareholders 
in the case of a corporate business, or the public fisc as in Dean v. Feed the 
Children)? 
Two provisions of the Model Rules are relevant to the question at hand: 
Rule 1.13 (Organization as Client) and Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Memorandum to the Board, supra note 7, at 3.  
 26. Amended Petition, supra note 5, at 3. 
 27. See generally id.  
 28. But see AICPA, Statement on Standards for Tax Services No. 6, Knowledge of Error: 
Return Preparation and Administrative Proceedings ¶ 3 (as in effect in 2009), available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/Tax/Resources/StandardsEthics/StatementsonStandardsforTax
Services/DownloadableDocuments/SSTS%202000-2009.pdf (“A member should inform the 
taxpayer promptly upon becoming aware of an error in a previously filed return or upon becoming 
aware of a taxpayer’s failure to file a required return. A member should recommend the corrective 
measures to be taken. Such recommendation may be given orally. The member is not obligated to 
inform the taxing authority, and a member may not do so without the taxpayer’s permission, 
except when required by law.”). 
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Information).29 Both of these rules were amended in 2003 largely in 
response to enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley30 and the adoption of Standards of 
Professional Conduct by the SEC requiring lawyers who practice before the 
SEC to report up-the-ladder material violations of law by SEC-regulated 
entities.31 
III. CLIMBING THE LADDER 
Model Rule 1.13 addresses, generally, a lawyer’s duties in representing 
an organization rather than an individual.32 Of particular interest in the 
situation at hand are paragraphs (b) and (c). Paragraph (b) requires a lawyer 
to climb up the corporate ladder in the circumstances described: 
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other 
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act 
or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation 
of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that 
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to 
result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall 
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. 
Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best 
interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to 
higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the 
circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the 
organization as determined by applicable law.33 
Comment [3] explains that while decisions by, for example, corporate 
officers generally must be accepted by the lawyer,  
when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially 
injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal 
obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Each state’s rules may vary from the Model Rules. Lawyers are therefore cautioned to 
check the provisions in their own states before proceeding as outlined in this Article. The author’s 
own state (New York), for example, does not include the provisions in Model Rule 1.6(b) 
discussed herein to the extent they pertain to injury to financial interests. In relevant part, New 
York’s version of Model Rule 1.6 provides only that a lawyer may reveal confidential client 
information “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm . . . [or] to prevent the 
client from committing a crime.” N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2009), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ForAttorneys/ProfessionalStandardsforAttorneys 
/NYRulesofProfessionalConduct4109.pdf. New York’s version of Model Rule 1.13(c) permits 
disclosure only if it would otherwise be permitted under Rule 1.6. Id. R. 1.13(c). The analysis 
presented and conclusions reached herein, therefore, could be quite different if the Plaintiffs had 
been lawyers admitted and practicing in New York. 
 30. Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) adopt minimum standards of conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the 
SEC. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 
745, 784 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245).  
 31. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2011). 
 32. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13 (2010). 
 33. Id. R. 1.13(b).  
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imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably 
necessary in the best interest of the organization.34  
In determining how to proceed, Comment [4] suggests that in some 
circumstances it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to 
reconsider the matter before the lawyer takes the issue up the corporate 
ladder: 
[F]or example, if the circumstances involve a constituent’s innocent 
misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer’s 
advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the 
organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher 
authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer’s 
advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter 
reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of 
sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, 
referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if 
the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent.35 
The Comment cautions the lawyer that “[a]ny measures taken should, to 
the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to 
the representation of persons outside the organization.”36 In the end, 
however, Rule 1.13(b) is mandatory; unless the lawyer reasonably believes 
that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, she 
must refer the matter to higher authority. 
In the Oklahoma case at hand, the Plaintiffs appear to have taken the 
matter directly to the Board rather than to an authority higher than the CFO 
but below the Board. Although we have no details regarding the 
organizational structure of FTC, Model Rule 1.13(b) seems to permit the 
bypassing of intermediate levels where a matter is of great importance. 
Thus, the fact that the Plaintiffs climbed directly to the top of the ladder 
rather than stopping at an intermediate rung does not appear to be of any 
consequence under Model Rule 1.13(b). 
A more interesting question is whether the acts themselves would 
invoke Model Rule 1.13(b) at all. The rule addresses only present and 
future acts, not acts that have occurred in the past. Nevertheless, the fact 
that the tax liability remains outstanding (assuming that the statute of 
limitations remains open) arguably makes the predicate act an ongoing 
matter.37 Moreover, Model Rule 1.13(b) applies only if the act or refusal to 
act is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization. The potential 
financial “hit” in this instance appears to be large, as are the repercussions 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. R. 1.13 cmt. [3].  
 35. Id. R. 1.13 cmt. [4].  
 36. Id.  
 37. Query whether the ongoing or future act (i.e., refusal to bring the matter to the attention of 
the Oklahoma Tax Commission) must itself violate either a legal obligation to the organization or 
a law in order for Model Rule 1.13(b) to apply. 
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from a reputational perspective, should the Oklahoma Tax Commission 
have discovered the tax delinquency on its own. Therefore, it appears that 
reporting the issue to the Board would have been appropriate by lawyers in 
the Plaintiffs’ position. 
IV. STEPPING OFF THE LADDER 
From an ethical perspective, the more complicated question is whether 
the Plaintiffs, had they been lawyers, would have been permitted to reveal 
the existence of the tax liability to the Oklahoma Tax Commission. Model 
Rule 1.13(c) addresses the question of whether disclosure to a non-client 
third party is permitted once the lawyer has reached the top of the 
organizational ladder without convincing the client to correct the problem.38 
Before contemplating that rule, however, Model Rule 1.6 must be 
considered both because it lays out the basic rules on lawyer-client 
confidentially and also because Rule 1.6 might permit disclosure by 
acrophobic lawyers, who can under certain circumstances disclose 
otherwise protected information without setting foot on the ladder at all. 
Model Rule 1.6(a) sets out the basic duty of confidentiality owed by 
lawyers to their clients: “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to 
the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the 
disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or 
the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”39 One of two exceptions in 
paragraph (b) is possibly relevant to the facts at hand, depending on 
whether one considers the Oklahoma tax issue to have been “cleaned up” or 
not. Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure of confidential information 
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6(a) to the extent that the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary “to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud 
that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has 
used or is using the lawyer’s services.”40 Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) applies 
where the “deed” has been done: a lawyer is permitted to reveal confidential 
information to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary “to 
prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from 
the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the 
client has used the lawyer’s services.”41 Both exceptions permit, but do not 
require, disclosure.42 Where disclosure is permitted, it may occur 
irrespective of the ladder. 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13(c). 
 39. Id. R. 1.6(a).  
 40. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2).  
 41. Id. R. 1.6(b)(3).  
 42. But see id. R. 4.1 (“In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) 
make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material 
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Both exceptions apply only where the lawyer’s services are or have 
been used by the client in perpetrating a crime of fraud. They do not apply 
where a lawyer learns of a crime or fraud in a context that is protected from 
disclosure under the general rule (Model Rule 1.6(a)) and the lawyer’s 
services are or were not involved. Assuming that the facts surrounding 
FTC’s nonpayment of Oklahoma use tax amounted to a crime or fraud,43 the 
question remains whether the Plaintiffs’ services were used in carrying it 
out. Both Plaintiffs had been employed by FTC for relatively short periods 
of time (Plaintiff 1 for less than one and one-half years, and Plaintiff 2 for 
only five months) when they became aware of the use tax situation.44 The 
facts set forth in their memorandum to the Board and their swift action in 
disclosing the matter to the Oklahoma Tax Commission and notifying the 
Board suggest that they acted shortly after learning of the problem and that 
their services had not been involved. Thus, if the Plaintiffs had been 
lawyers, it is doubtful that disclosure would have been permitted under 
Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) or (3). 
An issue that arises particularly in the context of tax practice relates to 
language that appears in both paragraphs—disclosure is permitted only if 
“substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another” actually 
occurred or is reasonably certain.45 When loss of tax revenue is at issue, 
what amounts to “substantial injury”? Because the phrase refers specifically 
to injury “of another,” it can be argued that substantiality is measured from 
the perspective of the injured party, not the client and not a hypothetical 
reasonable person. Since $1.1 million is not as likely to be “substantial” 
when lost by a government, as opposed to an individual, disclosure 
arguably is not permitted. On the other hand, such a reading of the 
substantiality requirement necessarily would have the effect of making the 
exceptions in Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) and (3) irrelevant in the context of tax 
fraud or crimes. At best, how to resolve the question is unclear. 
Model Rule 1.13(c) applies specifically to lawyers climbing 
organizational ladders pursuant to Model Rule 1.13(b). Model Rule 1.13(c) 
applies whether or not the lawyer’s services are or have been used in 
furtherance of a violation of law. Thus, it applies in situations in which 
Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) and (3) may not apply. Paragraph (c) of Model Rule 
1.13 provides: 
Except as provided in paragraph (d) [which is not relevant for present 
purposes], if 
                                                                                                                 
fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act 
by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.”).  
 43. This Article makes no attempt to resolve the question of whether the relevant facts amount 
to a crime or fraud, or what, as a general matter, constitutes crime or fraud. 
 44. See Amended Petition, supra note 5, at 1. 
 45. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2), (3) (2010). 
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(1) despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with [Model Rule 1.13] 
paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the 
organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate 
manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and 
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain 
to result in substantial injury to the organization, 
then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial 
injury to the organization.46 
Revealing information outside of the organization is discretionary, not 
mandatory. Moreover, Comment [6] cautions that when paragraph (c) is 
invoked, “the lawyer may reveal such information only when the 
organization’s highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened 
or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably 
certain substantial injury to the organization.”47 
If the conclusion reached earlier is correct (i.e., that FTC did not use the 
Plaintiffs’ services to commit a crime or fraud), then the only possible 
avenue for disclosing the violation of law to the Oklahoma Tax 
Commission would be Model Rule 1.13(c), assuming that the Plaintiffs 
were lawyers. Yet, Model Rule 1.13(c) permits disclosure only where there 
is a “violation of law” (not necessarily the same as “crime or fraud”), and 
only where that “violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial 
injury to the organization,” not to the injured party.48 If the lawyer discloses 
information to a non-client, the disclosure must be of no more information 
than the “lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to prevent substantial 
injury to the organization.”49 
The problem for lawyers in the situation at hand is that Model Rule 
1.13(c) permits disclosure only after the lawyer has climbed all the way to 
the top of the ladder and given the highest authority in the organization time 
to act or refuse to act. In the Feed the Children facts, the Plaintiffs sent their 
letter to the Oklahoma Tax Commission revealing FTC’s use tax shortfall 
before they notified the Board of the organization’s use tax liability and 
their disagreement with the CFO.50 The Board had no chance to consider 
the matter at all. If the Plaintiffs had been lawyers in a jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. R. 1.13(c).  
 47. Id. R. 1.13 cmt. [6].  
 48. Id. R. 1.13(c).  
 49. Id.  
 50. See Memorandum to the Board, supra note 7, at 1; Letter to Oklahoma Tax Commission, 
supra note 6. 
562 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 6 
following Model Rule 1.13(c), their actions could be grounds for 
professional discipline. 
In summary, had they been lawyers, the Plaintiffs would not have been 
required to disclose the tax liability to the Oklahoma Tax Commission. 
Disclosure clearly would have violated Model Rule 1.13(c), which required, 
inter alia, that the Board be given a chance to address the matter before 
disclosure was made. Disclosure would have been permissible under Model 
Rule 1.6(b)(2) and (3) only if the Plaintiffs’ services had been used to 
perpetrate a crime or fraud, which appears doubtful under the facts. If their 
services had been used, however, then disclosure—at any time—would 
have been permitted, as long as the injury to Oklahoma was substantial.51 
V. TO DISCLOSE OR NOT? 
If a lawyer has reached the top of the ladder and the conditions in 
Model Rule 1.13(c) are met, the lawyer may, but need not, reveal 
information relating to the representation—information that otherwise 
would be considered confidential—to a non-client. The lawyer can only 
reveal such information in order to prevent substantial injury to the 
organization, and the disclosure can be of no more information than the 
lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to prevent such injury. Should she 
disclose, or not? 
The facts in Dean v. Feed the Children reflect a possible, but highly 
significant, consequence of disclosure—namely, the loss of one’s 
livelihood. The Plaintiffs were fired. If the disclosing lawyer were outside 
counsel rather than a corporate employee, disclosure could—indeed, likely 
would—result in loss of a client. Moreover, should word spread, 
reputational questions inevitably would arise, raising the specter of 
difficulties in replacing either one’s job or one’s clients, or both. It is clear, 
then, that economic considerations dictate against disclosure. Up the 
ladder? Surely. Off the top? Probably not. 
Even if the Model Rules permit disclosure, the real possibilities of 
being fired or tagged as a lawyer who cannot be trusted with a secret are 
simply too great for even well-intentioned lawyers. The Model Rules, then, 
are unlikely to encourage lawyers to disclose. 
VI. A CONCLUDING NOTE ON SARBANES-OXLEY 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the regulations promulgated thereunder contain an 
up-the-ladder rule. Although earlier proposals would have required an 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Model Rule 1.6(b)(4) would have permitted the Plaintiffs, had they been lawyers, to reveal 
the confidential client information to another lawyer for the purpose of securing confidential legal 
advice on complying with the Model Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) 
(2010). Such disclosure is permitted “because of the importance of a lawyer’s compliance with the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id. R. 1.6 cmt. [9].  
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attorney to make a “noisy withdrawal” from representation and to report the 
withdrawal to the SEC, effectively notifying the SEC of corporate 
wrongdoing, the rule finally adopted largely mirrors Model Rule 1.13, with 
additional details. Attorneys are required to report up the ladder within an 
organization any “material violations of securities law or breach of 
fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to 
the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company.”52 If 
the attorney becomes aware of any material violation by the organization or 
an officer, director, employee or agent thereof, he or she has the duty to 
report such violation to the chief legal officer (CLO) and/or chief executive 
officer (CEO) of the organization. If the attorney does not believe that the 
CLO or CEO has properly resolved the matter, she must report the violation 
to the audit committee of the organization’s board of directors or to any 
other independent committee responsible for such matters.53  
The regulations under Sarbanes-Oxley permit, but do not require, 
disclosure of certain matters outside of the corporation. An attorney may 
reveal to the SEC, without the client’s permission,  
confidential information related to the representation to the extent the 
attorney reasonably believes is necessary: 
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation that is 
likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the 
issuer or investors, 
(ii) To prevent the issuer . . . from committing perjury, . . . suborning 
perjury, or committing any act . . . that is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon 
the [SEC]; or 
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer 
that caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or 
property of the issuer or investors in the furtherance of which the 
attorney’s services were used.54 
The circumstances described above are different from the 
circumstances meeting the definition of “material violation” and the 
provisions governing up-the-ladder reporting. Thus, reporting evidence of 
past material violations is not permitted in all instances. 
Some have characterized the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations as 
encouraging disclosure by attorneys.55 Like the Model Rules, however, the 
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley create little or no incentive for attorneys to 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 
745, 784 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245). 
 53. Id. § 307(2). Sarbanes-Oxley and the regulations promulgated thereunder apply only where 
the client is a public company that issues securities. 
 54. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2011). 
 55. E.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1287, 1298 (2007). 
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disclose legal violations and impose no consequences on those who choose 
not to disclose. To the contrary, many prudent attorneys, aware of their 
corporate clients’ transgressions, may well climb noiselessly down the 
ladder and return quietly to their law practices. 
